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This article argues that the novel’s embrace of inconsistency over rigour 
and commitment is its key distinguishing feature as a form of thought. 
Whereas critical theory, like other academic disciplines, tends to valorise 
rigorously argued and consistent ways of thinking, art – and in particular, 
the novel –has the capacity to generate different forms of knowledge 
through its inconsistency. Moreover, though, I also contend that the 
novelistic mode is a way of thinking that is not confined solely to texts that 
are themselves novels: it is also a mode that critical theory can engage. In 
this article, I analyse two texts characterised by this novelistic 
inconsistency: one by a novelist (Zadie Smith’s On Beauty), the other by a 
theorist (Judith Butler’s Precarious Life). Whereas Smith is open about her 
“ideological inconsistency,” Butler (as befits a writer of critical theory) 
tends to mask the discrepancies in her thought. I argue, however, that in 
their treatment of the question of authorial intention, both Smith and 
Butler adopt surprisingly similar positions: though predominantly loyal to 
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the psychoanalytic and poststructuralist critique of intention and of the 
sovereign subject more broadly, they nevertheless at times defend the 
idea of authorial intention. This inconsistency, I argue, is an important 
virtue in Smith and Butler’s discussions of intentionality, especially as it 
relates to the context they are both concerned with: the university 
campus. 
 The article is divided into four sections. In the first, I locate my 
intervention in terms of the reception of Butler’s critical thought and 
Smith’s writing, and in terms of a broader debate within literary studies 
about the relationship between literature and critical theory. I then move 
on to a discussion of Zadie Smith’s ambivalent treatment of 
psychoanalysis in her work, arguing that, despite criticizing certain forms 
of psychoanalytic thinking, her novels – in particular On Beauty – in fact 
both draw on and usefully expand Freudian insights. The third section 
turns to Judith Butler’s discussions of hate speech in Excitable Speech 
and Precarious Life. I identify an important change in her position 
between one text and the other: whereas Excitable Speech puts forward 
a rigorously anti-intentionalist theory of hate speech, Butler’s argument in 
Precarious Life is rather more complex, and, despite her anti-intentionalist 
rhetoric, often functions in practice as a defence of intention. The final 
section of the article puts Smith and Butler in direct conversation, via a 
comparative reading of two passages (one from On Beauty, the other 
from Precarious Life) that each focus on faculty meetings where a 
professor’s theoretical allegiance to the critique of intention is tested. 
These two novelistic moments, I argue, are valuable above all for their 
inconsistency. 
 
1. A Defence of Inconsistency 
In the foreword to her first collection of essays, British novelist 
Zadie Smith admits that the process of reading through the pieces that 
make up the volume forced her “to recognize that ideological 
inconsistency is, for me, practically an article of faith”: hence the title she 
gives the collection, Changing My Mind.1 It is a “confessional” title, she 
says, but also an “apt” one: it admits to a characteristic – inconsistency –
that might commonly be understood as a deficiency, but in copping to it 
so brazenly– on the cover of the book – she prompts her readers to 
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consider its virtues.2 In the parlance of social media, a humblebrag is a 
“seemingly modest, self-critical, or casual statement or reference that is 
meant to draw attention to one's admirable or impressive qualities.”3 
Smith’s title does something similar, if also subtler. The humility – the 
admission of inconsistency – functions not as a rhetorical cover for the 
brag; rather, Smith’s transparency regarding her tendency to change her 
mind does the reparative work of suggesting that inconsistency may itself 
be a quality worth bragging about. 
 But whereas it is relatively easy to accept that inconsistency may 
be an appealing quality in a novelist and journalistic essayist, it is harder 
to make the case that the same can be said of other forms of thought: 
critical theory, philosophy, literary scholarship. Such is the case of Roland 
Barthes, whose seeming drift away from the rigours of structuralism, 
Marxism, and psychoanalysis over the 1970s won him popular readers 
but cost him critical respect. In the final year of his life, Barthes lamented 
that “fickleness is never well regarded . . . what the Doxa admires is 
immutability, the persistence of an opinion.”4 In aesthetics, inconsistency 
can be a virtue; in spheres that value rigour and commitment – theory, 
politics, philosophy –it is more likely to be understood as a vice. When he 
spoke these words in 1980, Barthes was in fact less interested in 
producing theory or criticism, and more drawn to art. It was in literature – 
and above all the novel – that Barthes sought an antidote to the doxic 
valorisation of “immutability” and “persistence.” In the novel, he found a 
form that could accommodate the quality he shared with Smith: what 
Smith calls “ideological inconsistency” and what Barthes called nuance, 
or (as he puts it in his seminar about the process of preparing to write a 
novel) the ability to “change, vary, but in a nondogmatic way, like the 
shimmering of mottled silk (that is to say, without fanfare) on the curtain 
of life.”5 Therefore, despite the fact that Smith subjects Barthes (at least his 
early work, especially “The Death of the Author”) to stinging critique in 
Changing My Mind, the two of them have more in common than might be 
evident on first glance. The early Smith and the late Barthes both prefer 
flexibility to commitment, eclecticism to correctness, variety to 
consistency. And crucially, for both thinkers, their preferred qualities are 
aligned with literature rather than theory. 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 







 In this article, I take up the case that Smith and Barthes make for 
inconsistency, and for the novel as an especially compatible vehicle for 
this principle. My argument is this: that there are certain theoretical 
questions that demand inconsistent answers, and therefore in such cases 
the novel, rather than the critical-theoretical essay or monograph, is the 
form best suited to addressing them. The specific theoretical question I 
focus on is authorial intention, a question that entails a series of further 
questions: to what extent are an author’s intentions accessible? To what 
extent are statements of authorial intent helpful for understanding a text? 
To what extent are they relevant to an aesthetic judgment of the text? 
How, if at all, can an author be held responsible for the intentions a text 
may seem to express? At this point, there is within literary studies a 
relatively well-defined canon of theoretical sources that provide an array 
of answers to these questions. It runs from Plato’s Ion through Freud 
(“Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming”), to New Criticism (T.S. Eliot’s 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent” and Wimsatt and Beardsley’s “The 
Intentional Fallacy”), French Theory (Barthes’s “The Death of the Author”), 
and its Anglo-American reception (Steven Knapp and Walter Benn 
Michaels in “Against Theory”).6 As different as the positions each of the 
above texts offer are – for Wimsatt and Beardsley, statements of authorial 
intent are completely irrelevant to critical inquiry7; for Knapp and Michaels, 
intention and meaning are identical to one another8 – what all of these 
anthologized essays or selections have in common is a degree of 
rigorous internal consistency that belies the complexity of the issue at 
stake. 
 In the pages that follow, I turn to two writers whose approach to the 
issue of intentionality is notably – and, I argue, valuably – less consistent: 
Zadie Smith and Judith Butler. By comparing a novelist (Smith) and a 
theorist (Butler), I aim to demonstrate not that novels are inconsistent and 
theoretical monographs consistent, but rather that good answers to the 
questions inherent in the issue of authorial intention (and Smith and 
Butler both provide good answers) are necessarily inconsistent, whether 
they are found in the pages of a novel or of a work of theory. In the case 
of Butler’s theoretical work, though, this inconsistency, however valuable, 
tends to be masked, whereas Smith, as established above, is brazen 
about her tendency to change her mind. 
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 The argument that I make here intervenes at two different levels: 
first, in terms of the reception of the specific texts I analyse – Smith’s On 
Beauty (2005), and Butler’s Excitable Speech (1997) and Precarious Life 
(2004) – and second, at a broader level, in the question of the relationship 
between literature and critical theory. In the remainder of this introductory 
section, I lay out in more detail the nature of these two interventions. 
 Generally speaking, Smith and Butler have been read as members 
of opposite camps when it comes to the question of intention: Smith as 
someone who would defend its importance, and Butler as someone 
committed to its critique. In Smith’s case, this perception is no doubt 
linked to her Changing My Mind essay “Rereading Barthes and Nabokov,” 
in which she traces the chronological process by which she came to be a 
writer: from reading Dickens at secondary school, through the critical 
essays she read and wrote during her undergraduate studies, to her 
career as a writer of both fiction and non-fiction. Barthes’s power-to-the-
reader thesis in “The Death of the Author” represents an important but 
intermediate stage in Smith’s process of development. It allowed her to 
feel a part of the way a text produces meaning, but it ultimately side-lined 
the question of “what the author felt or wished you to feel”; when Smith 
became a writer, she tells us, she “felt the need to believe in [writing] as 
an intentional, directional act, an expression of an individual 
consciousness.”9 In On Beauty, furthermore, Smith takes the Barthesean 
critique of authorial intention – embodied in the novel’s protagonist, 
poststructuralist Art History professor Howard Belsey – as one of the key 
targets of her satire. A number of critics, understandably, have read the 
novel as an instance of the author “writ[ing] back” to the declaration of her 
death,10 or as an overturning of “postmodernist pieties about the 
impersonal sources of all subjective agency.”11 In this article, however, my 
claim is that On Beauty’s position with regard to the critique of intention is, 
to its credit, considerably more complex, and that it is in fact 
predominantly – albeit inconsistently – anti-intentionalist. 
 In the case of Butler, on the other hand, I am interested in the 
moments when the anti-intentionalism she has consistently avowed slips. 
For Butler, the critique of authorial intention is part and parcel of a larger 
critique of the autonomous humanist subject; the issue of intention, for 
her, exists at the intersection of what Barthes calls the death of the author, 
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and what Fredric Jameson calls the “death of the subject.”12 In Precarious 
Life, Butler explicitly draws the link between these two figures, referring to 
“the author-subject”: that is, the sovereign human subject understood as 
the author of itself, as fully intentional.13 As Mari Ruti has argued in 
Between Levinas and Lacan and “The Bad Habits of Critical Theory,” 
Butler’s continued “allegiance to the ritual of slaying the humanist subject” 
in texts like Precarious Life can have unfortunately limiting consequences: 
her rigid commitment to the critique of the agentic subject, for example, 
results in a blind spot when it comes to situations that require a more 
robust model of agency.14 But Ruti also points out that – especially in her 
more avowedly political work, work that is more in touch with the 
exigencies of lived experience (work that, as we will see, could be 
characterized as more novelistic) – Butler occasionally has “moments of 
ambivalence” about her loyalty to the project of decentring, demystifying, 
and disrupting the author-subject.15 My reading of Butler, then, points out 
something like a stifled sympathy between her wavering theoretical 
allegiances and Barthes’s rejection of the expectation that theoretical 
work be rigorously consistent. Barthes, over the course of the 1970s, 
gradually moved away from his early critique of the author-subject – a 
critique that motivated not only “The Death of the Author” but also other 
earlier work, in both a Marxist vein (Mythologies) and a structuralist one 
(S/Z). Butler, by the time of Precarious Life, has also begun to question 
her earlier anti-intentionalist arguments, even if she is not quite prepared 
to admit any interest in “the rehabilitation of the author-subject per se.”16 
 The reason it is especially helpful to think Smith and Butler 
alongside each other is that, for each of them, the inconsistency in their 
anti-intentionalism, the sympathy they display for authorial intention, 
becomes especially visible in the same context: discussions of hate 
speech and freedom of speech on university campuses. For both writers, 
this particular issue is one that highlights the limitations of a dogmatic 
version of anti-intentionalism: it is extremely difficult to engage in a 
nuanced way with questions concerning hate speech without recourse to 
a vocabulary of intentionality. My reading of Smith and Butler suggests 
that a willingness to depart at times from the anti-intentionalist training 
that both writers took part in (Smith as student, Butler as teacher and 
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thinker) is a crucial step towards being able to have a productive 
conversation about hate speech and academic freedom. 
 The second intervention I make in this article is in a conversation 
about the relationship between literature and other forms of thought – in 
particular, between the novel on the one hand and critical theory on the 
other. This is a conversation that has, for a number of reasons, been 
especially active in the last decade. Against the background of an 
especially fraught moment in what has been termed the crisis in the 
humanities, literary scholars have felt a renewed need to engage with the 
question of the precise kind of work that literature does in the world. For 
some, arguing that certain forms of theorizing have lost their vitality and 
political utility, it is important to show the ways in which literature can 
provide a source of resistance to the encroachments of theory – 
specifically, the form of theory that Rita Felski and others have referred to 
as critique. In Felski and Elizabeth S. Anker’s edited collection Critique and 
Postcritique, Anker makes the case for J. M. Coetzee’s novel The 
Childhood of Jesus as a text that “solicits the application of theory only to 
confound theorization.”17 Here, literature is the bulwark against the 
dangers of an excessive and dogmatic “allegiance to theory” and 
critique.18 For Marxist-oriented scholars like Anna Kornbluh, on the other 
hand, it is precisely an understanding literature as critique that must be 
“the basis of championing the humanities in endless crisis.”19 As opposed 
to Anker’s understanding of critique, which focuses on its negative 
attributes – “interrogation, debunking, and exposure”20 – Kornbluh 
emphasises “both the negative and affirmative poles of critique”: the fact 
that it builds new worlds as well as debunking existing ones.21 For her, the 
value of a novel such as Colson Whitehead’s The Underground Railroad 
is that it does the same kind of work as Marxist theory, diagnosing the 
negative aspects of its subject and positing utopian, affirmative 
alternatives.22 
At the same time, with the increasing institutional proximity of 
literary and academic knowledge production that Mark McGurl surveys in 
The Program Era, critical theory and the novel have become increasingly 
intertwined.23 Hence projects like Judith Ryan’s The Novel After Theory, or 
Mitchum Huehls’s “The Post-Theory Theory Novel.” As much as both of 
these critics emphasize the very specific ways in which critical theory has 
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made its way into novel-writing, they nevertheless maintain a relatively 
rigid distinction between the two spheres. The novel writes back to 
theory, which is also to say that it is something other than theory. The 
theory novels that Ryan reads “incorporate theory, they reflect on it, 
complicate it, and sometimes go beyond it,” but they remain separate 
from it.24 For Huehls, working on “a younger generation of writers . . . who 
were just as exposed to theory, but only after it had lost its cachet as the 
one true faith,”25 theory is likewise incorporated, but remains at arm’s 
length: “the post-theory theory novel avoids directly applying [theoretical] 
concepts to itself.”26 This is a markedly different position than that of Katie 
R. Muth, who argues for the importance of understanding Blood and Guts 
in High School by Kathy Acker (one of Ryan’s novelists after theory) as 
itself “an act of theorizing.”27 For Muth as for Kornbluh, reading the novel as 
theory is a way of engaging with “the question of what literary art is good 
for.”28 
The question as it appears more or less explicitly in these scholars’ 
work is this: does the novel respond to theory, or does it do theory? My 
own answer to the question is more closely aligned with Kornbluh and 
Muth than with Anker, Ryan, and Huehls. Like Muth, I am interested in a 
“more unified postwar canon” that includes texts across genres: novels, 
theory, and texts that unsettle the boundaries between these two fields.29 
Indeed, I want to reframe the question slightly, since to say that the novel 
does theory is to give theory a kind of categorical priority. I would be more 
inclined to put the two forms of thought on more even terms, as distinct 
but overlapping ways of approaching similar sets of questions. It is not so 
much that the novel does theory, but simply that the novel and theory 
often both do the same kinds of thing. But crucially, there is a difference 
between these two modes of doing. As Barthes suggests, what 
distinguishes the novel as a form of thinking is its openness to 
inconsistency. It is this nondogmatic, novelistic form of thought that I aim 
to make visible in both On Beauty and Precarious Life. 
 
2. Zadie Smith and Psychoanalysis 
In Cool Characters: Irony and American Fiction (2016), Lee 
Konstantinou insists that “it would be a mistake to describe Zadie Smith 
as a literary-critical reactionary”: she is undoubtedly “uneasy” with the 
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legacy of literary postmodernism and critical theory (and the critique of 
the author-subject that is inherent to both), but that does not mean that 
she wants to “roll back” this legacy and return to a simpler time, when the 
author was alive and well.30 Konstantinou briefly cites as evidence for this 
claim Smith’s preference for formal innovation, in her own work and that 
of other writers. In this section, I reach a similar conclusion to 
Konstantinou, but from a different angle. On Beauty, drawing as it does on 
E. M. Forster’s Howards End as well as the postwar campus novel, is 
Smith at her most formally traditional. Furthermore, it repeatedly connects 
Howard’s “postmodern” theoretical positions – his persistent need to 
critique, to subject the text and its author (or the painting and its artist) to 
forceful exposure and debunking –to his ethical and pedagogical failures. 
Indeed, the former often functions for him as an excuse for the latter: 
Howard’s loyalty to the postmodern critique of the author-subject is part 
and parcel of the fact that, as his wife Kiki tells him, “all you ever do is rip 
into everybody else.”31 But the critique of the critique of authorial intention 
is not necessarily the same as the reassertion of authorial intention. That 
On Beauty manages to exemplify the first without sliding into the second 
makes it all the more compelling as evidence that Smith is far from “a 
literary-critical reactionary.” In the passage from The Preparation of the 
Novel quoted above, Barthes distinguishes between two types of 
intellectual change: on the one hand, one can “change but dogmatize 
each change . . . worship what you have hitherto burned, and vice versa”; 
on the other hand is the kind of “nondogmatic,” “shimmering” change that 
he associates with the novel.32 It is easy to interpret “Rereading Barthes 
and Nabokov” as exemplifying the first kind of change: Smith seems to 
worship what she had hitherto burned – that is, authorial intention. Here, 
my claim is that On Beauty’s position with regard to authorial intention is 
actually much closer to the second type. Smith’s shimmering 
nondogmatism is especially visible in the way in which On Beauty 
engages with psychoanalysis, the example par excellence of a theory that 
undermines the idea of the sovereign intention. 
In “Rereading Barthes and Nabokov,” the flip side of Barthes’s 
power-to-the-reader thesis is the “bold assertion of authorial privilege” that 
Smith admires in Nabokov.33 And in Smith’s argument, such an assertion 
of the right to actualize authorial intentions goes hand in hand with an 
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aversion to psychoanalysis: “Nabokov’s profound hostility to Freud was no 
random whim – it was the theory of the unconscious itself that horrified 
him. He couldn’t stand to admit the existence of a secondary power 
directing and diverting his own. Few writers can.”34 Nabokov cannot stand 
Freud because Freud critiques the idea of the author-subject as fully 
intentional, as fully in control. Smith, on the other hand, although she 
admits to “a vocational need to believe in Nabokov’s vision of total 
control,” has a far more ambivalent attitude towards Freud.35 This is visible 
in Smith’s debut novel, White Teeth, which engages sympathetically with 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and its theorization of trauma, the death 
drive, and the repetition compulsion.36 Five years later, in On Beauty, 
Smith’s position in respect to psychoanalysis is ambivalent, but 
nevertheless far more open-minded than Nabokov’s. She is dismissive of 
a certain vulgar Freudianism, but accepts and even expands the basic 
psychoanalytic insight that our conscious intentions are constantly and 
fundamentally undermined by the unconscious. 
 The first of the two extra-marital affairs that Howard has is with his 
colleague and long-time friend, the poet Claire Malcolm. Claire goes 
twice a week to see a psychiatrist in Boston named Dr Byford, who 
interprets her symptoms as part of “a pattern . . . rooted in her earliest 
babyhood”37: Claire is, according to Dr Byford, “a woman still controlled by 
the traumas of her girlhood.”38 This version of psychoanalysis is not one 
that is presented in an especially positive light. It is certainly one that 
Lacan, with his disdain for American ego-psychology, would scoff at, not 
least because Dr Byford sees the unconscious residues of trauma as 
immunizing Claire against all responsibility – “It made more sense to put 
her three-year-old self in the dock”39 – whereas Lacan sees the 
psychoanalytic discovery as making the subject precisely more 
responsible for their actions.40 This crude version of psychoanalysis is 
essentially a story told to explain away irrational behaviour, for the 
purposes of comfort and stability.  
 But there is a better, less trite reading of Freud that informs On 
Beauty, one in which we are not reducible to comprehensible, pleasure-
driven intentions and the obstacles that stand in their way. Smith is 
especially interested in the role of the body in relation to our conscious 
intentions, and in that sense, the closest theoretical parallel to what she 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 







does with psychoanalysis, I would suggest, is Shoshana Felman’s The 
Scandal of the Speaking Body. Felman’s project in this book is to bring 
together Lacanian psychoanalysis and J. L. Austin’s work on the 
performative in order to theorize the speech act as a specifically bodily 
act. For Felman, “the relation between language and the body” is one “of 
incongruity and inseparability.”41 Judith Butler summarizes her argument 
as follows: Felman “suggests that the speech act, as the act of a speaking 
body, is always to some extent unknowing about what it performs, that it 
always says something that it does not intend, and that it is not the 
emblem of mastery or control that it sometimes purports to be.”42 Felman’s 
reading of Freud (alongside Austin and Lacan) is one that undermines the 
sovereign intentional subject much more profoundly than Dr Byford’s 
clichéd ego-psychology. For Felman, “Freud discovers not simply that the 
act subverts knowledge” – this would be Byford’s reading – “but also that 
it is precisely from the breach in knowledge” – that is, the unconscious – 
“that the act takes its performative power: it is the very knowledge that 
cannot know itself” – again, the unconscious, here in Lacan’s definition43 – 
“that, in man, acts.”44 To put that more simply, the unconscious is not a 
mere obstacle to the speech act – it is a fundamental part of what speaks. 
And it is through the body that this unconscious-driven, perpetually 
misfiring speech act takes place. 
 A similar interpretation of the Freudian insight is visible in On 
Beauty, in the way that Smith’s speaking bodies always say and do things 
that they do not intend. The most important example here is Kiki, who is 
all too aware of the ways in which her body, combined with the cultural 
history in which it is entwined, exceeds her intentions: 
Kiki suspected already that this would be one of those familiar 
exchanges in which her enormous spellbinding bosom would play 
a subtle (or not so subtle, depending on the person) silent third role 
in the conversation… The size was sexual and at the same time 
more than sexual: sex was only one small element of its symbolic 
range. If she were white, maybe it would refer only to sex, but she 
was not. And so her chest gave off a mass of signals beyond her 
direct control: sassy, sisterly, predatory, motherly, threatening, 
comforting . . . Her body had directed her to a new personality; 
people expected new things of her, some of them good, some not.45 
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Here, as in The Scandal of the Speaking Body, the body is “that which 
acts in excess of what is said.”46 But Smith also departs from Felman, in 
that she is much more interested in the social. In this specific example, 
Smith is interested in the part that race plays in the black female body’s 
excessive signification. And more broadly, she’s interested in the ways in 
which our intentions are undermined by other people – by the conscious 
intentions and by the unconscious drives and desires of those with whom 
we share the world. 
 In On Beauty, then, Smith draws on Freud’s analysis of the ways in 
which the unconscious undermines our conscious intentions, but she is 
also interested in the many other forces that undermine our intentions. To 
put it another way, she draws on the psychoanalytic insight about the 
ways in which our intentions fail because of our selves, but adds to this a 
consideration of the ways in which our intentions fail because of others. 
Thus, on the one hand, Smith consistently demonstrates the ways in 
which our unconscious drives us towards things from which our 
pleasure-driven intentions would run the opposite way. This tendency is 
visible in a passage in which Howard goes wandering and ends up, 
without realizing, on the doorstep of the father he has conscientiously 
avoided for four years: “He had no plans – or at least, his conscious mind 
told him he had none. His subconscious had other ideas.”47 It is also 
visible in the way that Claire offers herself to Howard, even though “she 
had not really known why,” even though she is in a stable relationship 
with someone else, and even though she had “no sexual desire 
whatsoever” for him.48 But on the other hand, Smith also brings out the 
complex negotiation that takes place between our desires (conscious 
and unconscious) and the desires of others – family, friends, or lovers. 
Sometimes our intentions fail because another character has the 
opposite intention: “I know that wasn’t your original intention, Howard, but 
given the circumstances . . .”49 Sometimes they go awry because another 
character has the same intention, as when Howard and Kiki fight: 
“Howard was intent on slamming the door behind him, and Kiki was 
equally determined to kick it shut. The force of it knocked the plaster 
picture to the floor.”50 And sometimes, as in the example discussed above, 
they fail because of the complex interaction between our intentions, our 
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bodies, the racial imaginaries through which others see them, and our 
corresponding perceptions of those others’ perceptions. 
 
3. Judith Butler’s Disavowed Defence of Intention 
In the following section, I consider Judith Butler’s treatment of the 
same question. Smith’s approach to intentionality, I argued, is 
characterised by a Barthesean shimmering nondogmatism: intentions are 
complexly determined and of shifting visibility and effectiveness, rather 
than simply either sovereign or irrelevant. Butler, by contrast, seems 
dogmatic: the pose she adopts is consistently anti-intentionalist, at least 
at the level of her rhetoric. But by comparing the way in which she 
analyses a single topic – hate speech – from two different perspectives 
(the addressee of hate speech in Excitable Speech; the one who is 
accused of committing hate speech in Precarious Life), it becomes 
evident that Butler’s position is rather less consistent than it initially 
seems. My claim is that, in Precarious Life, Butler may attempt to frame 
her intervention as a critique of intention, but it is actually closer to a 
defence. Smith’s proudly affirmed changes of mind and the inconsistency 
that Butler attempts to mask therefore put the two of them in closer 
conversation than their contrasting ways of framing their work imply. 
In 1997’s Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, as the 
subtitle suggests, Butler’s main project is to translate the insights about 
performativity she developed in Gender Trouble into the scene of the 
politics of speech: speech understood as having a performative function, 
and as having concrete political stakes, such as the fighting words 
doctrine, hate speech, and other forms of legally regulated expression. 
Butler understands hate speech as form of injurious speech,51 but also 
wants to maintain that its effects are not as determined as Catharine 
MacKinnon – who argued in Only Words that pornography authoritatively 
and deterministically “wields a performative power” that cannot but injure 
women52 – would maintain. Hate speech, for Butler, is a citation, a 
repetition of a term that carries with it a long history of sedimented 
meanings, just like the gender norms she analysed in Gender Trouble. 
Hence its degree of authority is unstable: where there is repetition, for 
Butler, there is the possibility of subversion. Hate speech attempts to 
silence its addressee, and may well succeed, but it may also provide the 
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addressee with the unexpected opportunity to expropriate its power via a 
process of subversive resignification that, like the drag performances of 
Gender Trouble, contains the possibility of resistance. This possibility is 
what Butler understands by agency. She maintains that her critique of 
sovereignty and of the author-subject does not mean “the demolition of 
agency,” but rather that “agency begins where sovereignty wanes”: 
agency for Butler is always situated and conditioned, and always 
preceded by “a linguistic field of enabling constraints.”53 This is therefore 
very much an anti-intentionalist discussion of hate speech. The person 
who utters the hate speech cannot ensure that their utterance is (to use 
the vocabulary of J. L. Austin, on whom Butler continues to draw here) 
felicitous: “the subject does not exercise sovereign power over what it 
says.”54 The intention of the one who utters hate speech matters little; her 
focus instead is on the addressee of hate speech, and the ways in which 
they can resist the violent interpellations of the one addressing them. 
 In the fourth chapter of 2004’s Precarious Life, however, Butler’s 
focus shifts away from the addressee of hate speech, and toward the 
addressee of the charge of hate speech. And in this shift, Butler ends up 
doing two important things. First, she demonstrates the ways in which the 
framework of intention and effect elides the ability to talk about hate 
speech with any nuance. And second, against her anti-intentionalist 
history (on full display in Excitable Speech), she carves out a certain 
degree of space for intentionality. 
 If Excitable Speech is an argument against institutional control over 
speech (see especially chapter 2’s extended critique of the then-current 
“Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding homosexuality in the U.S. military), 
“The Charge of Anti-Semitism” is a more extended analysis of the 
consequences of such institutional control, specifically in the context of 
the university campus. The chapter’s starting point is a statement made 
by then-President of Harvard, Lawrence Summers, on September 17, 
2002 – around the time that Zadie Smith would have arrived at Harvard as 
a Radcliffe Fellow. Butler begins as follows: 
When the President of Harvard University, Lawrence 
Summers, remarked that to criticize Israel at this time and to 
call upon universities to divest from Israel are “actions that 
are anti-Semitic in their effect, if not their intent,” he 
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introduced a distinction between an effective and intentional 
anti-Semitism that is controversial at best.55  
Although Butler frames this chapter in her preface to Precarious Life as 
primarily a discussion of the censorship of certain kinds of critical 
speech,56 the chapter turns, as its opening sentence makes clear, on a 
discussion of intention, and its relationship to effect. Her argument about 
Summers’s controversial distinction between intent and effect runs as 
follows. First, she points out that what Summers is talking about is a kind 
of speech act that has an anti-Semitic effect “even if [anti-Semitism] is not 
part of the conscious intention of those who make the utterance itself.”57 
That is, we have something like the inverse of the situation that Butler 
imagines in Excitable Speech. There we had an utterance that, because 
of the potential for subversive repetition, may fail to have an injurious 
effect despite having a conscious intention to injure. Here, we have an 
utterance that supposedly does have an injurious effect, despite there 
having been no conscious intent to injure. What remains the same, 
importantly, is that intention is beside the point. Summers, like the Butler 
of Excitable Speech, approaches hate speech from a specifically anti-
intentionalist point of view. Of course, his reasons for adopting this 
perspective seem to be different from Butler’s: whereas anti-
intentionalism is part and parcel of the critique of the author-subject to 
which Butler is committed, Summers seems to be avoiding imputing the 
intentions of the intellectuals he discusses for more pragmatic reasons. It 
is a group of “serious and thoughtful people,” he tells us, in “progressive 
intellectual communities,” whom Summers is accusing of effective anti-
Semitism – some of them, presumably, his own colleagues. Accordingly, it 
makes sense for Summers to avoid giving the impression that he believes 
them to be harbouring hateful views (intentional anti-Semitism), even if 
the alternative is rather patronizing (“I know you don’t really mean to be 
anti-Semitic, but…”). Regardless of the particular reasons for Summers’s 
anti-intentional method, though, what is interesting and unexpected here 
is that, in arguing against his approach, Butler ends up departing in an 
important way from her own position in Excitable Speech. 
 Her argument continues by examining two separate interpretations 
of what Summers could mean by effective anti-Semitism. The first 
possibility she considers is that Summers is imagining that, in “the public 
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sphere of the US,” there exists a dominant “acoustic frame” that governs 
the reception of criticisms of Israel, such that these criticisms cannot but 
be heard as anti-Semitic.58 In this case, “we are asked to conjure a listener 
who attributes intention to the speaker,” which means that “the only way 
to understand effective anti-Semitism would be to presuppose intentional 
anti-Semitism.”59 Under that possibility, then, the intent/effect distinction 
that Summers tries to draw collapses, in that the effect of the utterance is 
imagined as retroactively determining its intention, even if the intention 
was entirely different. 
 The second possibility Butler considers is “that critical statements 
will be used by those who have anti-Semitic intent.”60 Butler acknowledges 
that a criticism of Israel does indeed run the risk of being exploited in this 
way, but maintains that if Summers is going to claim that this risk means 
that those criticisms have a determinately anti-Semitic effect, then he is 
ceding far too much power to the imagined exploiters. “Here again,” she 
writes, “the distinction between effective anti-Semitism and intended anti-
Semitism folds, insofar as the only way a statement can become 
effectively anti-Semitic is if there is, somewhere, an intention to use the 
statement for anti-Semitic aims, an intention imagined as enormously 
effective in realizing its aims.”61 It is worth pausing over this. In that last 
phrase – “an intention imagined as enormously effective in realizing its 
aims” – Butler is presenting her argument as a critique of sovereign 
intentionality. This is the same move she uses in Excitable Speech, when 
she critiques Althusser’s theory of interpellation for similarly relying on an 
idea of the policeman’s speech act of hailing the subject as sovereign62 – 
as “enormously effective in realizing its aims.” But in this chapter, the anti-
intentional rhetoric belies the larger point she’s making: namely, that 
under both the possible interpretations she considers, she argues that 
Summers gives too much interpretive power to the reception of an 
utterance, and not enough interpretive power to the one who utters it. In 
other words, she is putting forward a defence of intention. This point 
emerges all the more clearly a few pages later: 
According to Summers, there are some forms of anti-
Semitism that are characterized retroactively by those who 
decide upon their status. This means that nothing should be 
said or done that will be taken to be anti-Semitic by others. 
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But what if the others who are listening are wrong? If we 
take one form of anti-Semitism to be defined retroactively by 
those who listen to a certain set of speech acts, or witness a 
certain set of protests against Israel, then what is left of the 
possibility of legitimate protests against a given state, either 
by its own population or by those who live outside those 
borders? If we say that every time “Israel” is uttered, the 
speaker really means “Jews,” then we have foreclosed in 
advance the possibility that the speaker really means 
“Israel.”63 
“But what if the others who are listening are wrong?” What if the speaker 
meant what they said? What if their intention really was that transparent 
and accessible? This is Butler at her most un-Butlerian, her most anti-anti-
intentional. It is Butler, against all odds, advocating something like surface 
reading, or at least leaving open the possibility that surface reading might, 
in some circumstances, have better interpretations than suspicious, 
paranoid, depth reading. In Excitable Speech, she argued that the 
addressee of an utterance can subversively resignify it, short-circuiting its 
intentions. Here, she critiques Summers for arguing what appears to be 
the same thing: that utterances can be “characterized retroactively by 
those who decide upon their status.” 
 But my point here is not to criticize Butler for her inconsistency. 
Insofar as I disagree with Butler, it is for the way she tries to mask her 
inconsistency. My contention, rather, is that the contradiction between her 
position in Excitable Speech and her position in “The Charge of Anti-
Semitism” is evidence that sometimes – and hate speech is a case in 
point – inconsistency is necessary. 
 In Excitable Speech, Butler talks about speech acts that contain the 
possibility of failure: speech acts where the effect does not match the 
intent, infelicitous speech acts. And in that book, she wants for those 
speech acts to be infelicitous, because she is invested in the project of 
giving the addressees of hate speech agency, and agency, for Butler, is a 
matter of subversive repetition – a matter of subverting the intentions of a 
speech act. In “The Charge of Anti-Semitism,” she is also talking about 
infelicitous speech acts. But here, she wants for them to be felicitous: she 
wants for somebody to be able to voice a criticism of Israel, and for that 
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criticism to be read precisely as a criticism of Israel, as intended. There, 
she was talking about turning actual hate speech into something that 
resists hate speech. Here, she is talking about statements that are not 
hate speech, and safeguarding their status as not-hate-speech. There, 
she needed to be able to counter an understanding of speech as fully 
and sovereignly intentional. Here, she needs to be able to counter an 
understanding of speech in which intentions are irrelevant. Yes, there is 
an inconsistency regarding the status of intention there, but it is for good 
reason. It is important to be able to think both the subversive repetition of 
hate speech and the academic freedom to voice criticisms of Israel at the 
same time, and doing so means saying, essentially, that no, intentions are 
not deterministic or sovereign – and no, intentions are not irrelevant 
either. 
 
4. The Humanities Quandary 
By this point in the article, I hope to have established the following: 
that despite their differing sets of theoretical allegiances, and despite 
Butler’s attempts to frame her theoretical work as consistently anti-
intentionalist, On Beauty and Precarious Life both demonstrate a 
significant degree of nondogmatism or inconsistency that helps them to 
engage with the question of authorial intent in a more generative manner. 
In this final section, I want to extend that argument, linking it explicitly to 
the question of novelistic form. The kind of generative inconsistency that I 
have identified in Smith and Butler is a quality that Barthes associated 
with the novel. Here, I look at two particular passages – one from On 
Beauty, the other from Precarious Life – that share not only this quality of 
generative inconsistency, but also a striking degree of similarity in content 
and form: both take place in universities, at meetings of faculty and 
administration, focusing on a professor whose theoretical allegiance to 
the critique of intention runs up against limitations, and both are 
novelistic: not only in that they are narratively driven, but also in that they 
stage what Amanda Anderson and Sianne Ngai both identify as one of 
the key tensions of the novelistic tradition (especially in the realist mode): 
“the relation between ideas and life, or how one might live theory.”64 It is 
this encounter between theory and lived experience that is at the heart of 
the connection between inconsistency and novelistic form: when it 
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encounters the messy contours of lived experience, as both On Beauty 
and Precarious Life render all too clearly, theory, no matter how rigorously 
argued, finds it difficult to maintain its consistency. This is not to try to 
point out a fatal flaw in the project of theory. Far from it: my aim here is 
rather to show how the theoretical and the novelistic – understood as 
modes in which any text, whether its cover proclaims it a novel or its 
bookstore placement categorizes it as a theoretical monograph, may 
partake – augment each other. “Inconsistency” is one way of naming the 
creative results of that messy, augmentative encounter. 
 The two novelistic moments I am concerned with here centre 
respectively on Howard Belsey and on Judith Butler herself. In the first 
case, Howard runs into a conflict between his theoretical positions and 
lived experience when his rival, Monty Kipps, proposes to deliver a series 
of lectures with the Stanley-Fish-esque title “Taking the Liberal Out of the 
Liberal Arts.”65 Anticipating that the lectures might “contravene the internal 
‘hate laws’ of” the college where Howard and Monty teach, and eager for 
an opportunity to cut his rival down to size, Howard asks that the faculty 
“be given a proposed outline of these lectures; or, failing that, we shall be 
told this morning what the intention of the lectures is.”66 Howard, that is, 
commits the intentional fallacy – a fact Monty seizes on with glee: “I am 
afraid I am quite unable to answer his frankly bizarre request for their 
‘intention’. In fact, I admit it surprises and delights me that a self-professed 
‘textual anarchist’ like Dr Belsey should be so passionate to know the 
intention of a piece of writing.”67 Monty seizes here on the inconsistency 
between Howard’s anti-intentionalist theoretical stance and his request 
that Monty divulge his “intention,” leaving Howard in a double bind. He 
finds himself in need of the very same ideas that prop up the “mytheme of 
the artist as autonomous individual” that he has been so committed to 
interrogating: intentionality, determinacy of signification, the author as the 
origin of the text and guardian of its meaning.68 Sticking to his 
poststructuralist guns would mean ceding to Monty’s arguments; 
maintaining his request for Monty’s intention entails facing accusations of 
hypocrisy. He doubles down on the latter, interrupting Kipps’s vague 
outline of the proposed lectures, not this time to ask what their intention 
is, but, more intentional-fallaciously still, to claim knowledge of Monty’s 
“clear intention of antagonizing and alienating various minority groups on 
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this campus.”69 At this point, the meeting turns into a carnivalesque face-
off. With Howard having adopted the nominally conservative position of 
claiming that intention is accessible and relevant, Monty mimics the 
opposite view: 
Now is it not you, Dr, who speaks of the instability of textual 
meaning? Is it not you, Dr, who speaks of the indeterminacy 
of all sign systems? How, then, can I possibly predict before I 
give my lectures how the “multivalency” . . . of my own text 
will be received in the “heterogeneous consciousnesses” of 
my audience?70 
Monty is speaking in a warped version of Howard’s own “textual 
anarchist” voice. He adopts Howard’s Barthesean approach in both 
content and form: his speech is a tissue of unattributed citations (“the 
‘multivalency’ . . . of my own text”; “the ‘heterogeneous consciousnesses’ 
of my audience”), making it impossible for Howard to work out exactly 
what he is being accused of, or by whom. 
 This dilemma is the one Butler refers to as “the humanities 
quandary”: “no one knows who is speaking and in what voice, and with 
what intent. Does anyone stand by the words they utter? Can we still 
trace those words to a speaker or, indeed, a writer? And which message, 
exactly, was being sent?”71 It is a quandary in which the question of 
authorial intention is made newly urgent, and it is one that, near the 
beginning of Precarious Life’s final chapter, she describes encountering 
for herself. As in On Beauty, the encounter takes place at a faculty 
meeting – here, during a discussion of the crisis in the humanities. Faced 
with the sense “that something called the humanities was being derided 
from some direction or another” – even if she is unable to work out 
precisely who is levelling this charge – Butler feels the need to respond.72 
Her ability to respond effectively, however, is undermined by the fact that 
the charge (that the humanities have lost their moral authority) has no 
clearly discernible origin: it is filtered through multiple layers of reported 
speech and rhetorical evasiveness, meaning that “it was not always 
possible to tell which view was owned by whom, or whether anyone 
really was willing to own a view.”73 Just as Howard wants a simple answer 
to a complex question – what are Monty’s intentions for his lecture series 
– Butler appears momentarily tempted by the old fantasy of transparently 
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accessible authorial intentions. If she could just work out “who is 
speaking and in what voice, and with what intent,” then maybe she would 
be better equipped to defend the humanities. The double bind, the 
humanities quandary, the novelistic tension between ideas and life: here 
they rise to the surface, troubling Butler’s rigorously theorized anti-
intentionalism. 
 Of course, in the end she remains committed to the critique of “the 
author-subject.”74 “[I]t would be paradoxical,” she claims, “if I were now to 
argue that what we really need is to tether discourse to authors, and in 
that way we will reestablish both authors and authority. I did my own bit 
of work, along with many of you, in trying to cut that tether.”75 Here she 
alludes to Excitable Speech, in which her focus was on “untethering the 
speech act from the sovereign subject.”76 In this essay from Precarious 
Life, as in “The Charge of Anti-Semitism,” Butler props up the theoretical 
consistency of her career-long critique of the author-subject via the 
rhetoric of anti-intentionalism. The chapter proceeds to leave this 
novelistic scene of tension and temptation behind, turning away from 
anecdote and lived experience to a discussion of Levinas. Having put 
paid to the spectre of intention, Butler returns to her theoretical comfort 
zone. 
 But as brief as Butler’s hesitation is, my aim in this article has been 
to suggest that there is something about this kind of moment of 
inconsistency that not only provides a better way into questions having to 
do with intention and hate speech, but which also can be understood as 
distinctly novelistic. The novelistic mode, then, is one that – as Elizabeth 
Anker and Judith Ryan suggest – complicates and at times resists theory 
by putting theoretical concepts into unpredictable and volatile contact 
with lived experience. But it is also – as Anna Kornbluh argues – a way of 
working in parallel to theory, an alternative form of critique. What 
distinguishes this novelistic form of theorizing – and the precise reason it 
is most worth attending to – is its inconsistency.  
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